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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LEONARD STEWART, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20090572-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate-review jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e)(2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in accepting as evidence an unsigned Judgment and 
Sentence Order from the Fourth District Court as evidence that Stewart had twice been 
convicted of a qualifying theft offense. (R. 79: 42; 80: 5). 
Standard of Review: "The standard of review for a conclusion of law is one of 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's decision." James v. 
Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also, State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 
433 (Utah 1993). 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by considering evidence of prior 
convictions after the trial phase. (R. 80: 4-5; 48 ). 
Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts "have consistently held that the proper 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that should be reviewed for correctness." 
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^ 14. 127 P.3d 682. 
CONTROLLING CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions and statutes are set forth in the Addenda of 
the Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Leonard Stewart appeals from a bench trial conviction of Retail Theft with Prior 
Convictions, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and 76-6-
412 before the Honorable Gary D. Stott of the Fourth District Court,. 
Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 
Stewart was charged by Information of the offense Retail Theft with Priors, under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and 76-6-412(l)(b)(2) on October 9, 2008. A Preliminary 
Hearing was sel, but subsequently waived and Stewart entered his plea of not guilty on 
December 18, 2008. The matter was then set for a one-day bench trial to be held on April 
21, 2009 before the Honorable Gary D. Stott. (R. 22-23). 
At trial, the State presented evidence of the underlying theft through the testimony 
of Kendall Young (R. 79: 2-25) and Gregory Sherwood (R. 79: 27-36). After the State 
presented evidence that Stewart had attempted to steal a wallet, valued at $8.99, and a 
belt, valued at $19.99, (R. 79: 17), the State proffered evidence of Stewart's prior 
convictions in the form of one judicially signed Judgment and Sentence Order out of 
Payson City Justice Court and one unsigned Judgment and Sentence Order out of the 
Fourth Judicial District, Provo, Utah. (R. 79: 38). 
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In closing arguments, defense counsel argued the validity of the unsigned Order as 
proof of a prior conviction. (R. 79: 42). Based on the evidence and argument regarding 
the proof of Stewart's prior convictions for theft, the trial court found Stewart guilty of 
the underlying offense and accepted the documentation as sufficient proof of prior 
convictions. (R. 79: 39-44). Defendant filed the Motion to Arrest Judgment based on the 
trial court's acceptance of the unsigned order out of the Fourth Judicial Court (R. 43), and 
the matter was subsequently set for sentencing. 
On June 25, 2009, at sentencing, the trial court denied Stewart's Motion to Arrest 
Judgment. (R. 80: 5). The trial court then sentenced Stewart to an indeterminate 
sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for a third-degree felony theft. (R. 
80: 9). Stewart timely filed his notice of appeal on July 6, 2009. (R. 71). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, the State offered two documents to show that Stewart had twice been 
convicted of a qualifying theft offense. First, the State offered evidence in the form of a 
signed Judgment and Sentence Order of Stewart's conviction of theft in the Payson City 
Justice Court. (R. 79: 38) (Exhibit #2). This was received into evidence without 
objection. (R. 79: 38). 
Second, the State offered an unsigned Judgment and Sentence Order of Stewart's 
conviction of retail theft from the Fourth District Court. (R. 79: 39-40) (Exhibit #3). The 
State addressed the trial court regarding Exhibit #3 as follows: 
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MR. STURGILL: Judge, this is the - this is the second conviction I 
intended to use, but as you see, or if you can see, noticeably absent (inaudible) 
signature. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STURGILL: Here is the court's file. I had it pulled hoping that I 
would see a signed copy, the same order, and it's not signed, it's in the same 
condition as the one you have before you. But I would point out that there is a 
written minute entry that reflects basically the same thing that's reflected in the 
typed-up minute entry. I think the combination of- I don't know if we want to 
remove this, have a copy made, certified, and -
THE COURT: You've seen three? 
MR. MEANS: Yes. 
THE COURT: The minute-
MR. MEANS: But I have seen-
MR. STURGILL: I would just ask that you consider that in combination 
with your - consult to this file and take judicial notice of the second prior theft. 
THE COURT: With - with the notification that you show me in the file, I 
can probably accept Exhibit 3 in evidence. 
MR. MEANS: You're accepting number 3, which is the copy of the 
document from the court's file? 
THE COURT: The copy of the document from Judge Howard's court, 
October 29, 2003. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 received). 
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(R. 79: 39-40). Defense counsel raised the issue of Exhibit #3 being sufficient proof of a 
prior conviction in closing argument. (R. 79: 42). 
Defense counsel argued and the State responded to the trial court as follows: 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, I'm only asking you to focus on Exhibit No. 3, 
which is - I forgot the case number, but it represents a document from the file in 
this court from Judge Howard's district or division. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. MEANS: And I didn't object to its introduction because apparently it 
accurately reflects what's in the file, what's in the court's file, which you also 
have in front of you, and I would just note that it purports to be a judgment and 
sentence from 2003 for a theft, I think a class A misdemeanor, but it's unsigned. 
And it would be my argument that a judgment is not a judgment until it's issued 
by the court, and I believe it has to be signed to be issued. The fact that it's in the 
file is interesting, but it doesn't constitute a judgment. I donT believe a minute 
entry, an unsigned minute entry, would constitute a judgment either. I think that's 
what you have underneath it is a minute entry, apparently filled out by a clerk, not 
signed by either a clerk or a judge. So it would by my argument that the state's 
not carried its burden to prove the prior convictions, because they proved only one 
prior conviction, and for this to be a felony, it needs to - the state needs to 
establish the existence of two prior felonies. I think that state's adequately 
established the theft, which in this instance would be a class B misdemeanor. 
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MR. STRUGILL: I think whaf s necessary - what the state needs to prove 
is that the defendant has two prior convictions of theft. I think if you consider the 
document that is - that is Exhibit 3, along with the Court's file, you consult the 
Court's file, I think there is ample evidence that there was a prior conviction in 
Judge Howard's court. As the Court is well aware, the prior are - are not 
necessarily - well they are not relevant to guilty. They are actually a sentencing 
enhancement. And if your Honor is not comfortable with State's Exhibit No. 3 
constituting a prior conviction, there's two things I would suggest. One, I would 
invite you to go back and - and I can pull the - review the record, both the time the 
defendant entered his plea before Judge Howard and the time that he was 
sentenced. I believe both of those hearings were either audio or videotaped. And 
the second suggestion would be that you determine guilt at this point, and wait 
until sentencing to determine the degree of the offense, whether it be a class B 
misdemeanor or third degree felony, and give the state an opportunity to present 
additional prior thefts, robbery or burglary convictions. 
THE COURT: Based upon the testimony and the exhibits that have been 
received, the Court finds that the essential elements of the crimes charged have 
been established.... I find him guilty of the - of the crime of theft as charged in 
count one. As to the issue of the enhancement, the Court finds that the documents 
shown in Exhibit 3 and supporting information contained in the court's file, 
October the 23rd of 2003, are all consistent with that finding of guilty and the 
imposition of sentence. Matter of fact, look - just quickly looking through the 
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file, there were continued participations with the defendant for a considerable 
period of time through May of 2006 on varied charge with - with Adult Probation 
and Parole, even with Judge Laycock and failure to comply with probation on the 
sentencing for the theft. I believe that there's ample evidence to establish the prior 
convictions. However, I will allow the State to supplement at the time of 
sentencing any additional information you believe you want the Court to consider 
for the purpose of addressing the question on the prior conviction in the second 
matter. 
Following the trial court's ruling at trial, but before sentencing, Stewart filed the 
Motion to Arrest Judgment. (R. 43). The State responded to this motion and attached a 
signed copy of a Judgment and Sentence Order corresponding to Exhibit #3. (R. 53-57). 
The State also attached a previous conviction for aggravated robbery from 1988, which 
was not presented at trial. (R. 51-52). 
At sentencing, the parties argued the Motion to Arrest Judgment before the 
Honorable Gary D. Stott. (R. 80: 1-5). Stewart argued that the judgment proffered by the 
State (Exhibit #3) was unsigned and therefore invalid. (R. 80: 1-2). The State argued 
that "prior convictions are not elements to the offense, they don't need to be presented at 
trial during the guilt phase, rather they are sentencing enhancements that can be 
introduced at court anytime between the finding of guilt and the time of sentencing." (R. 
80: 2-3). 
After hearing argument the trial court denied Stewart's motion. The trial court 
stated: 
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THE COURT: Tve read Anderson [State v Anderson. 797 P.2d 1114 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)]. Considering that which has been filed b> Counsel, 
addressing the arguments, the Court finds that the enhancement is accepted. 
Anderson is distinguishable on its facts. I don't find it to be authoritative for the 
relief requested with respect to the defendant. There was the evaluation made at 
the time of this matter as to what the status was of Judge Howard's case, and even 
though subsequent to that time the document has appeared with his signature, the 
Court finds that still there is basis on which the enhancement occur - can occur, 
and therefore the third degree felony stands. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Stewart asserts that first, the trial court erred by accepting an unsigned judgment 
presented by the State at trial as proof of prior convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
412. Furthermore, the trial court erred in considering the issue of prior convictions after 
the trial phase. This was erroneous because prior convictions, as plainly outlined in the 
statutory scheme, is an essential element to third-degree felony theft with priors. Thus, 
proof of prior convictions is an element that must be presented to the trier of fact and 
cannot be considered afterward. 
Furthermore, Stewart contends that the practical and policy implications of not 
finding that the subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 would frustrate the criminal 
justice system. Particularly, if the State were allowed to present evidence of prior 
convictions after trial, a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial would be adversely 
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affected and the sentencing recommendations provided by Adult Probation and Parole 
would be compromised. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BY ACCEPTING THE UNSIGNED JUDGMENT AT TRIAL, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED STEWART OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE 
PROCESS 
A criminal conviction based on insufficient evidence that does not prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt deprives a person of due process of law. See, Utah Const, art. 
I, § 7. It is a well-established principle in criminal law that the State bears the burden of 
proving guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to "every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 
L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); see also, State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) 
(holding that he "United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution require that the 
burden of proving all elements of a crime is on the prosecution."). 
Here, the trial court erroneously accepted into evidence an unsigned document 
which purported to prove Stewart had a prior conviction for theft. The trial court's error 
of acceptance of this document substantially impaired Stewart's right to due process and 
thus is a matter of law. Thus, this Court should "accord the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference but instead review them for correctness." State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 
433 (Utah 1993). 
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a. The Trial Court Incorrectly Accepted an Unsigned Judgment Order as 
Sufficient Proof of a Prior Conviction of Theft Contrary to State v. 
Anderson 
In 1990, this Court clearly established that a judgment reflecting a prior conviction 
must be written, clear, definite, and signed by the court. State v. Anderson. 797 P.2d 
1114, 1116-117 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Stewart made this assertion in his Motion to 
Arrest Judgment. (R. 43). Anderson is clearly authoritative on this issue. 
In Anderson, the trial court erroneously accepted evidence of the defendant's prior 
convictions in order to substantiate a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
412(l)(b)(ii) (1990). Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
establishing the defendant's two prior convictions, the State introduced three pieces of 
evidence: (1) a form entitled "Information,'* which listed the defendant's name, the 
charge of petty larceny, and some notes made by the clerk which stated that "Defendant 
was convicted of the charge below;" (2) a form dated 12-02-83, that listed the 
defendant's name and some handwritten notations that a court clerk testified indicated a 
conviction for retail theft; and (3) a form entitled "Circuit Court Criminal Case 
Filing/Disposition Report" from the Ninth Circuit Court, Cedar City Department, which 
showed the defendant was found guilty of "defrauding an innkeeper," but it was 
unsigned. Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1115. 
In Anderson, this Court's analysis focused on the evidentiary discrepancies 
between civil and criminal law, and establishing a more consistent and reliable method 
for recording convictions. Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1115-16. Furthermore, this Court 
noted that Rule 81(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "which serves generally to 
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unify civil and criminal procedure in Utah[,]" requires that criminal courts compl} with 
Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1116-17. Rule 
58A required that the trial court or a clerk sign and file a written judgment. Anderson. 
797 P.2d at 1116-17 (emphasis added). This was based on the logic that trial courts 
should comply with this principle because of the ''more onerous criminal penalties" 
involved in the criminal justice system, and thus require more than just a Cwvague. 
secondary record of the judgment." Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1116-17. 
Based on these principles, this Court rejected any unsigned evidence of a prior 
conviction. Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1117. Specifically, this Court found that all three 
pieces of evidence, even the clearly written, yet unsigned court document, were 
"inadequate to support the trial court's finding that Anderson had been twice convicted of 
theft/' In its holding, this Court stated that c'[o]ur ruling thus requires that a judgment of 
prior conviction be written, clear, and definite, and signed by the court (or the clerk in a 
jury case) in order to serve as the basis for enhancing a penalty pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(ii) (1990)." Anderson, 797 P.2d. at 1117. This case is exactly on 
point and authoritative as to this matter. 
Here, the trial court erred in dismissing Anderson as authoritative to the issue of 
whether an unsigned document is sufficient evidence to prove a prior conviction. Here, 
the State concluded its case in chief by proffering two documents that purported to 
substantiate that Stewart had been twice convicted of theft. (R. 79: 38-40). One 
document, Exhibit #2, evidenced that Stewart had been convicted of theft in the Payson 
City Justice Court. (Exhibit #2). That document was signed by Justice Court Judge 
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James E. Box. (Exhibit #2). The second document provided a copy of the minute entry 
of Stewart's alleged conviction for retail theft in the Fourth District Court. Provo. 
(Exhibit #3). Unlike Exhibit #2. Exhibit #3 was unsigned, and Stewart objected to the 
court considering this document as evidence of a prior conviction. (R. 79: 42-43). The 
trial court, however, concluded that both documents were sufficient to support the 
enhancement.1 (R. 79: 44). 
After the bench trial had concluded and Stewart had filed his Motion to Arrest 
Judgment based, in part, on this issue, the trial court entertained oral argument on the 
matter. (R. 80: 1-5). 
At argument, Stewart pointed out that Anderson stood for the "proposition that a 
judgment to be valid needs to be signed." (R. 80: 2). Conversely, the State argued that 
the present facts are distinguishable from Anderson. Specifically, the State argued: 
Judge, the Anderson case is distinguished, or can be distinguished from this 
case. The biggest difference is that in Anderson, nothing ever was 
presented that constituted a prior conviction. Nothing even close was 
introduced either at trial or before sentencing that would've amounted to a -
any evidence of a prior conviction. Judge, I would submit that your - your 
finding and your burden is basically - is to determine whether or not there 
has been a prior conviction, and I think you did just that at the time of the 
trial in looking at the actual file, observing that there was an order, albeit 
unsigned, but then also observing that history in that entire file of Judge 
Howard's case. 
(R. 80: 3). 
In conclusion, the trial court held: 
1
 The trial court also stated that because there was evidence in the court file that 
defendant had further issues and was on supervised probation, that that evidenced, despite 
a signature, that Stewart was indeed convicted previously. (R. 79: 44). 
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Fve read Anderson. Considering that which has been filed by Counsel 
addressing the arguments, the Court finds that the enhancement is accepted. 
Anderson is distinguishable on its facts. I don't find it to be authoritative 
for the relief requested with respect to this defendant. There was the 
evaluation made at the time of this matter as to what the status was of Judge 
Howard's case, and even though subsequent to that time the document has 
appeared with his signature, the Court finds that still there is basis on which 
the enhancement occur - can occur, and therefore the third degree felony 
stands. 
(R. 80: 5). Stewart asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing Anderson because this 
Court's holding in that matter is directly on point and indistinguishable. 
In Anderson, this Court gave particular reasoning as to why a criminal court must 
sign a judgment in order to validate it. First, an "entry of a time-stamped, written 
judgment*' clearly makes a record of judgment which simplifies timing issues, such as 
post-trial motions. Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1117. Second, and most importantly, wwa 
written judgment in proper form is clear evidence of the defendant's conviction in later 
proceedings^]" Anderson, 797 P.2d. at 1116. Third, "a written judgment signed by the 
judge helps assure the absence of clerical error or misunderstanding in the record and 
shows that responsibility for the judgment rests on the shoulders of the judge[.]" 
Anderson, 797 P.2d. at 1116 (emphasis added). Fourth, a written, signed document 
provides appellate courts with at least the beginnings of a meaningful review. Anderson, 
797 P.2d. at 1116. This reasoning supports a finding under these circumstances the fact 
that the unsigned order out of the Fourth Judicial District (Exhibit #3) was insufficient to 
show Stewart had been previously convicted. 
Furthermore, any factual differences are insignificant and do not impact the 
control Anderson has over these facts. As mentioned, the State argued that in Anderson, 
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"nothing ever was presented that constituted a prior conviction[;]" but that here the trial 
court had the Cwactual file" which reflected the history of the case. (R. 80: 3). Contrary to 
that argument, the facts here and in Anderson are nearly identical. 
In Anderson, the trial court was presented with evidence regarding prior 
convictions. As noted previously, despite the detailed nature of even the document from 
the Ninth Circuit Court, Cedar City, the fact that it was unsigned defeated any evidentiary 
value it was proposed to have regarding that prior conviction. Anderson, 797 P.2d. at 
1117. Here too, the State presented an unsigned Judgment (Exhibit #3). And the fact 
that the trial court viewed the court file and found another unsigned order, only supports 
Stewart's position that no valid judgment had been entered. Under Anderson, this is 
clearly insufficient evidence for the trial court to consider as evidence of a prior 
conviction. 
Therefore, under Anderson, the trial court incorrectly accepted Exhibit #3 as 
evidence of Stewart's prior conviction. As such, Stewart requests that this Court modify 
judgment to reflect a conviction in this matter as a class B misdemeanor, based on value, 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and 76-6-412(l)(d). 
2
 Because the trial court's ruling did not address the validity of the documents presented 
after the trial in the State's Response (R. 63), but rather affirmed its holding at trial that 
Exhibit #3 was valid evidence of Stewart's prior conviction, this Court should not 
consider other documents. See, Bailey v. Bailey, 2002 UT 58,*{ 22, 52 P.3d 1158 
(holding that appellate courts are limited to the facts determined by the trial court). 
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 REQUIRES 
THAT PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS BE CONSIDERED AN 
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT 
Utah appeallate courts "have consistently held that the proper interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law that should be reviewed for correctness." State v. Barrett, 
2005 UT 88, f^ 14. "When interpreting statutes, this court first looks to the plain 
language...presuming] that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to 
each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. Barrett. 2005 UT 88, |^ 29. 
Furthermore, when considering the plain language of the statute, courts should read such 
language "as a whole[] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the 
same chapter and related chapters." Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f^ 29. Stewart asserts that the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(ii), when read as a whole and in 
conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 requires that proof of prior convictions 
must be an element of the offense, which must be presented to the trier-of-fact at trial. 
Here, the State failed to present sufficient evidence of Stewart's prior convictions 
at trial. Procedurally, the State ended its case-in-chief by proffering two exhibits: Exhibit 
#2 - the signed Judgment and Sentence Order from the Payson City Justice Court; and 
Exhibit #3 - the unsigned Judgment and Sentence Order from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court. (R. 79: 38-39). Defense counsel then objected to introduction of Exhibit #3 on 
the grounds that it was unsigned and therefore not a valid judgment as proof of a prior 
conviction. (R. 79: 42). The trial court, however, accepted the unsigned order as valid 
evidence of a prior conviction. (R. 79: 44). 
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Subsequently, Stewart filed his Motion to Arrest Judgment. (R. 43). Stewart's 
motion addressed the invalidity of an unsigned order and the need to present such 
evidence at trial because it is an element of the offense. (R. 43-31). In response, the 
State refuted those assertions. (R. 63-59). Moreover, the State attached, what was 
Exhibit #3, but now signed nunc pro tunc by the Honorable Fred D. Howard of the 
Fourth District Court and a newly presented Judgment and Commitment Order from the 
Sixth Judicial District for Stewart for an aggravated robbery conviction from 1988. (R: 
57-51). These two documents were brought to the trial court's attention during oral 
argument on Stewart's motion. (R. 80: 2-3). Notwithstanding the presentation of these 
documents, the trial court affirmed its decision from the trial and stated that "the Court 
finds that still there is basis on which the enhancement occur - can occur, and therefore 
the third degree felony stands." (R. 80: 5). 
Stewart asserts that, as an element of the offense, it is the State's burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier-of-fact that he had twice been convicted of a 
qualifying theft offense to convict him of a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-412(l)(b)(ii). See, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970) (State must prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged"); see also, State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (holding that he "United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution require that the burden of proving all 
elements of a crime is on the prosecution."). 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the word "element" as "one of the necessary 
data or values on which calculations or conclusions are based[.]" Merriam-Webster 
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Online Dictionary, "element." http://ww^.merriam-webster.com/dictionar\/element. 
Black's defines "elements of a crime" as *"[t]he constituent parts of a crime — usu. 
consisting of the actus reus, mens rea, and causation — that the prosecution must prove 
to sustain a conviction." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), elements of crime. 
Furthermore, Utah Code defines "element of the offense" as "[t]he conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition 
of the offense" and "[t]he culpable mental state required.'' Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
501(2)(a)-(b)(1973). 
Essentially, an "element'' is something necessary to that substance's nature or 
composition - such as hydrogen is a necessary element of water (H20) - and without that 
element the nature or composition of that substance materially changes. Such is the case 
here. 
To be convicted of a retail theft, as in this case, the State had a dual burden. First, 
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart concealed or 
carried away any merchandise in a retail establishment with the intention of retaining the 
merchandise or permanently depriving the store of that item without paying for that 
item.3 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (1979); (R. 5). 
Second, depending on how the State has charged the offense, it must prove 
additional elements. For example, here, the State charged and Stewart received notice 
that he had allegedly committed a third-degree felony. (R. 5). This is based on the 
State's theory that he committed a theft and committed that theft having been twice 
3
 Stewart does not challenge the trial court's finding that he committed a "theft." 
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convicted of theft before. (R. 5). In any theft case, the State must proof the deprivation 
of property and either the value of the item or whether prior convictions exist. The latter 
part materially changes the nature of the offense and must be considered an element of 
the offense that must be presented to the trier-of-fact for consideration. 
Implicit in this Court's holding in State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. Ct. 
1998) is the requirement that value be presented to the trier-of-fact for determination of 
the exact offense committed. In Lyman, the defendant disputed his felony theft 
conviction on the basis that the evidence presented to the jury regarding the item's 
market-value was insufficient to establish the required value amount to substantiate a 
felony conviction. Lyman, 966 P.2d at 283-85. Lyman presents a situation where the 
trier-of-fact, in this case a jury, was charged with determining whether the evidence 
presented was sufficient to prove the value of the item taken beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Lyman, 966 P.2d at 283-85. 
Furthermore, this requirement was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. In 
State v. Davis, the Utah Supreme Court noted that wiin order for a theft conviction to be 
punishable as a second degree felony (as this one was), the requirements of § 76-6-412 
must also be satisfied." Davis. 689 P.2d 5, 10, n. 12 (Utah 1984). Thus, value is an 
inherently critical element of a theft offense under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602. 
Similarly here, proof of prior convictions must be treated as an element to be 
proven to the trier-of-fact. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, degrees of theft are 
classified either by value or the "attendant circumstances", Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
501(2)(a)-(b) (1973), such as whether a weapon was involved or, as in this case, the 
"actor has been twice before convicted of theft...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1 )(b)(ii) 
(1997). Without proving beyond a reasonable doubt those "attendant circumstances'' or 
elements, there is no true designation as to what crime was actually committed. 
Essentially, there is a missing ''element'5 which, if proven, will change the entire 
composition or nature of the crime. 
Furthermore, this situation is akin to State v. Angus. 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978) 
and State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191. In Lopes, the Utah Supreme Court 
confronted whether the legislature's creation of the "gang enhancement statute" was 
merely an enhancement or whether it was a new and separate offense. Lopes, 1999 UT 
24, ^ 5, 22. In its analysis, the Lopes court relied on its decision in Angus. 
The issue in Angus was whether the State, which charged defendant with 
aggravated assault, must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in 
order to "enhance" the penalty. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^[ 11-12. In its holding, the Angus 
court stated that "the legislature, by enacting the firearm enhancement, had increased the 
degree of the crime by establishing a separate set of elements, that, if proven, warranted a 
higher punishment." Lopes, 1999 UT 24, j^ 12. But more importantly, the court found 
that "while the State did not need to separately charge the enhancement as a crime, it did 
need to prove each element, including the defendant's use of a firearm, beyond a 
reasonable doubt because the crime was increased as to degree by the presence of a 
firearm." Lopes, 1999 UT 24, J^ 12 (emphasis added). The decision in Lopes echoed this 
holding with regards to the "gang enhancement" statute. 
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In Lopes, the court first addressed the important fact that as a constitutional and 
statutory requirement, the State must prove each element of every offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 13-14. The Lopes court then keenly identified 
that the legislature had repeated what was previously done and addressed in the Angus 
case. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f^ 15. Specifically, the court recognized that the legislature had 
"mandated imposition of an enhancement only upon proof of elements over and above 
those required for the crime of lesser consequence." Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 15. 
Consequently, the court found great similarity between the facts of Lopes and 
Angus. Thus, the court held that, "[i]n essence, [the legislature] created a specific new 
crime or a crime of a higher degree. As such each of the elements must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Lopes, 1999 UT 24, |^ 15. 
Here, the State is also required to prove the existence of prior convictions to the 
trier-of-fact beyond a reasonable doubt at trail. In Angus, the court concisely addressed 
the issue which exists here by hypothetical: "An assault without a deadly weapon is a 
crime of less danger to the victim and to the public, and is therefore of lesser degree and 
lesser punishment, than an assault with a deadly weapon. Because of this difference, the 
former is a class B misdemeanor while the latter is a felony of the third degree." Angus, 
581 P.2d at 995. Essentially, this example highlights the difference between punishments 
for basically the same offense (e.g. assault or theft), but that the punishment of the 
offense can change with the addition of facts - weapons, value, or, as in this case, prior 
convictions. Clearly, these are elements that must be considered at trial. 
Here, by the State failing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart was 
indeed previously twice convicted of theft, the State has only shown that a theft has 
occurred, but with no consequence or classification. As stated, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
602 establishes the elements required to prove whether a retail theft occurred, but not 
what type or degree of a retail theft. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 is the missing link, 
which provides the final and determining element of whether a class B misdemeanor has 
occurred or a third-degree felony. If the elements in section 76-6-412 were not such, then 
the value of a crime would be of no consequence. That would, however, be illogical in 
incongruent with the statutory interpretation of the theft statutes. The reason it would be 
illogical is because without the establishment of value, there is no crime, not even a class 
B (which requires that some value be established, albeit less than $300). See, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-412(1 )(d). 
But because the legislature has chosen to include additional elements through 
section 76-6-412, those elements materially change the composition or nature of the 
offense. For instance, if the State were to prove a depravation of property, as they did in 
this case, there is nothing to guide the trier of fact as to what to convict the person of 
without that missing element. As such, the plain and logical reading of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-412 must be that this section sets forth additional elements, not ^enhancements,v 
which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 
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III. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED AN 
ELEMENT OF A THEFT OFFENSE TO COMPLY WITH JURY TRIALS 
AND SENTENCING PROCEDURE 
By not having the trier-of-fact consider all the elements of an offense - namely, 
whether he had twice been convicted of theft - the defendant is deprived of his right to a 
jury trial. Utah Const, art. I, § 10.4 In the case of a jury trial, without requiring the State 
to prove prior convictions (or any of the other elements that affect criminal classification) 
under section 76-6-412, a jury could possibly only be required to hear evidence of an 
intentional deprivation of property to reach a verdict. Then, has the State essentially 
argued to the trial court (R. 80: 2-3), the State could present issues of value, of whether 
there was a weapon involved, or whether defendant had been twice convicted of a theft 
offense at any time after trial all the way up to sentencing. 
But, if elements like whether a weapon was involved or whether the defendant had 
been twice convicted of a qualifying theft offense are not presented to the jury, then it 
would be presented to the trial court. As such, a defendant would have his right to a jury 
trial infringed upon, because they would no longer be in a position to consider elements 
of the offense. Consideration of the crucial elements in § 76-6-412, including prior 
conviction, must be a trial issue or otherwise it would be contrary to Lyman and Davis. 
Finally, and as a policy matter, the elements in § 76-6-412 must be considered at 
trial to facilitate sentencing. As a practical matter, most defendants convicted of felonies 
are ordered to have a pre-sentence report or investigation completed by Adult Probation 
4
 Although Stewart received a bench trial, this argument goes to the overall policy and 
constitutional arguments of having the trier-of-fact consider all evidence of guilt. 
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and Parole. See, State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, Tf 6, 218 P.3d 610; and State v. Yazzie. 
2009 UT 14, % 3-4, 203 P.3d 984. This is an important tool to courts for sentencing 
purpose. See, Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-20 (2009). However, if the level of offense is not 
determined at trial by the trier-of-fact, the Department of Corrections, through Adult 
Probation and Parole, will be impeded in their effort to supply the court with a sentencing 
recommendation. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Stewart respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's error as to the 
validity of Exhibit #3 as sufficient evidence of Stewart's prior conviction in light of 
Anderson. And, that this Court find that the State failed to prove Stewart's prior 
convictions at trial as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412. 
Consequently, Stewart requests that this Court reverse his conviction for third-
degree felony theft and enter his conviction as a class B misdemeanor based on the value 
established at trial (less than $300). See, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209, 1211 (Utah 
1993). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /f^ day of February, 2010. 
Margaret P*. Lindsay 
Michael S. Brown 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant to the Appeals Division. Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South. Sixth 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this ft day of February, 2010. 
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Westlaw 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of Utah 
^y Article I. Declaration of Rights 
-t Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 10 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of Utah 
*li Article I. Declaration of Rights 
-• Sec. 10. [Trial by jury] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the 
Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four 
persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-6-412 Page 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*j§j Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*y Part 4. Theft 
-t § 76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit 
theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, 
cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits theft of property de-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-6-412 Page 2 
scribed in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any 
sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-412; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 18; Laws 1975, c. 48, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 89, § 1; Laws 
1989, c. 78, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 14, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 139, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 
1997, c. 119, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1997, c. 289, § 8, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-602 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*(! Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*S Part 6. Retail Theft 
_• § 76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away or transferred, any mer-
chandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of re-
taining such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or 
benefit of such merchandise without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid 
in determining value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile estab-
lishment and attempts to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the retail 
value with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment 
from the container in or on which such merchandise is displayed to any other container with the intention of de-
priving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving 
the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1979, c. 78, §2. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
IN THE PAYSON CITY JUSTICE COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Payson City, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Leonard Stewart, 
) JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
) Case No: 99-1226 
) Citation No.: 
) 
Defendant. 
APPEARED on October 4,1999. 
Count I: Theft Count II: 
Count III: Count IV: 
Dismissed Violations:. 
Judge's findings Accepted a plea of guilty to count I. 
SENTENCE FINE: $555.00 180 days jail. Jail time and $255.00 to be 
suspended upon compliance to #1. 
Total Due: $300.00 
* Suspended upon compliance of the following terms: 
x 1. Pay fine according to agreement below. 
2. Serve days in Jail/Dates: 
_ 3. Provide proof of restitution in the amount of $ 
4. No Driving without valid Utah Drivers License and Insurance. 
_5. No further alcohol/drug offenses for a period of months. 
6. No further acts of theft for a period of months. 
7. Return to Court on to end probation 
8. Other: 
Payment plan: $50.00 due on or before October 31,1999. $50.00 per month until 
fine is paid in full. 
Late Payment or No Payment Results In Arrest Warrant Adding $100 
Afh Dated this 4m day of October 1999 
Defendant mailed/given copy: 
M. 
mes E. Box-Justice Court Judge 
CbRTiFY Tn.S IS A TRUE COPY OF 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE 
PAYSON JUSTICE COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
T H E F T 
A person commits theft if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him of it. 
PENALTY 
Theft is punishable as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
S 100.00 or less. The maximum penalty for a class B misdemeanor is [1] 180 days in jail 
and/or [2] fines and assessments of $1,850.00. 
PENALTY E N H A N C E M E N T S 
Theft is a third degree felony if the actor has been convicted twice before of theft. 
The maximum penalty for a third degree felony is [1] five years in prison and [2] fines and 
assessments of $9,250.00. 
I [Please PRINT your name] V^POftfc&> ~S ^ S t ^ u 3 # V have read and 
understand the above information. 
i * ^ -
DATED this ^ day of ( g j S & S - ^ , 199^ 
W^v^ S t a ^ T ^ 
jc\ehanpage tht(394) 
i iP=HS' 
PAYSON CITY COURT 
439 WEST UTAH AVENUE 
PAYSON, UT 84651 
(801)465-5210 
JAMES E. BOX 
ARRAIGNMENT 
(RIGHTS IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION) 
ou have the right to be represented by counsel. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent 
ipon request, IE YOU ARE INDIGENT, AND IF THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY THAT YOU 
JLD BE SENTENCED TO JAIL AS A RESULT OF BEING CONVICTED. 
DU have the right to a speedy trial. 
DU have the nght to a jury trial upon proper written request to the court. 
ou have the nght to have an information filed in writing specifying the charge(s) against you. 
3u have the nght to confront and cross examine in open court the witnesses which prosecution calls to testify against 
DU have the nght to voluntarily testify in your own defense, after which you can be cross examined by the prosecution. 
)u have the nght to have witnesses subpoenaed, to ensure that anyone you desire to have in court will appear. 
)u are considered innocent of any charges by this court and the burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable 
is upon the City, County, or State, 
u have the right to remain silent at trial and the nght not to be compelled by the court to testify if you choose to remain 
rou have the nght to appeal the verdict or judgment of this court to the District Court of jurisdiction and to have a new 
pon proper request to this court. 
ou have the right to be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of the law. 
'you enter a plea of NOT GUILTY, the matter will be set for pre-trial. 
'you enter a plea of GUILTY to the charge(s), you will give up all the rights just-mentioned, thus leaving yourself at 
s
,rcy of the Court and will be subject to sentencing. 
s
 you enter a plea of GUILTY the Judge will inquire if: 
a. you make the plea knowingly and voluntarily. 
b. you make the plea without force or coercion. 
c. you understand the possible consequences of making a plea of guilty in a Court. 
d. you are free from drugs/alcohol or anything that would impair your ability to make a decision. 
e. the Judge will also determine if there is a factual basis to support the entry of plea to the charge(s). 
ENCES THAT ARE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT. If there are multiple charges pending, the 
may impose consecutive sentences. The judge is not required to follow the recommendation of any person as to 
sentence to impose and the Judge may impose a sentence with the following limits. 
ss B Misdemeanor: 0 to 180 days in jail and a fine of $0.00 to $1,800.00 
ss C misdemeanor: 0 to 90 days in jail and a fine of $0.00 to $750.00 
•action: A fine of $0.00 to $750.00 
D.O.B yfe/^^* h a v e reacj m\d understand the above information. 
;s y?9a?< /0CD5. Apt ft- C k v f e ^ State^Zigf^Phone: ^ T - 5 ? g 2 
ihis of £ 5 c W & £ ^ 19SR S i m a t u ^ S ^ e X ^ S ^ i T O T H i S IS A TRUE COPY OF 
J
 ' —'
 b
 ^ ^ ^ AN ORIGINAL DOCUlVteTTOTTTTUE IN THE 
PAYSON JUSTICE COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
: D O C K E T # STATE OF UTAH. 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LEONARD STEWART, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031401281 FS 
Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
Date: October 29, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sherylc 
Prosecutor: LARSON, CURTIS L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CARD, SCOTT P 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 16, 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: FDH 034 9 Tape Count: 11:42 
CHARGES 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) (amended) - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/05/2003 Guilty 
2. ATTEMPTED PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 06/05/2003 No Contest 
HEARING 
TAPE: FDH 0349 COUNT: 11:42 
Defendant appears with counsel. Mr. Card addresses summary 
corrections to the Presentence Investigation Report. The State 
requests the defendant be placed with a monitor while on home 
confinement. 
The Court reserves for review, the early termination of the 
defendant, depending upon successful probation. 
Case No: 031401281 
Date: Oct 29, 2003 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 
day(s) in the UTAH COUNTY JAIL. The total time suspended for this 
charge is 245 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED PURCH/POSS 
DANGEROUS WEAPON a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 3 65 day(s) in the UTAH COUNTY JAIL. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Defendant is sentenced to serve 12 0 day(s) of home confinement. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The Court authorizes medical release for treatment and medical 
appointments. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $1895.00 
Surcharge: $277 . 97 
Due: $605.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $4395.00 
Total Surcharge: $277.97 
Total Principal Due: $605.00 
Plus Interest 
Fine payments are to be made to ADULT PROBATION & PA Court. 
Case No: 
Date: 
031401281 
Oct 29, 2003 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Security fee of $25.00 each count has been added to the fine. 
Complete 100 hour(s) of community service in lieu of $300.00 
Community service to be completed through ADULT PROBATION AND 
PAROLE. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE. 
Defendant to serve 120 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the UTAH COUNTY JAIL. 
Defendant is to report by October 27, 2003 by 5:00 p.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 605.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Defendant is ordered to enter into an agreement with the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department and comply strictly with the terms 
of probation. 
Defendant is ordered to make himself/herself available to the Adult 
Probation and Parole and to the Court when requested to do so. 
Defendant is ordered to advise Adult Probation and Parole and this 
Court of a current address at all times while on probation. 
Defendant is ordered to not violate the laws of the United States, 
the State of Utah, the laws of any state or any municipality. 
Defendant is ordered to serve jail in the Utah County Jail as 
ordered by the court. 
Fines and fees to be paid as directed by Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Defendant is ordered to pay a supervision fee at the discretion of 
the probation officer. 
Defendant is ordered to permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole 
to search his person, residence or his vehicle or any other 
property under his control without a warrant at any time, day or 
nght, to ensure compliance with the probation agreement. 
Defendant is ordered to remain drug and alcohol-free for the 
duration of probation and submit to tests for the presence of drugs 
or alcohol. 
Do not frequent establishments where alcohol i s chief item of 
Case No: 031401281 
Date: Oct 29, 2003 
order. 
Do not frequent places where drugs are used or sold, nor associate 
with persons known to use or sell non-prescribed controlled 
substances, and not obtain prescriptions for controlled substances 
without prior knowledge of probation officer. 
Defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the monitor. 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
FRED D HOWARD 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 031401281 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
By Hand STATE OF UTAH 
By Hand DEFENDER PUBLIC 
By Hand UTAH COUNTY JAIL 
By Hand AP&P 
Dated this day of 20 
Deputy Court Clerk 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LEONARD STEWART, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031401281 FS 
Judge: FRED D HOWARD 
Date: October 29, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sherylc 
Prosecutor: LARSON, CURTIS L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CARD, SCOTT P 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 16, 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: FDH 0349 Tape Count: 11:42 
CHARGES 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) (amended) - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/05/2003 Guilty 
2. ATTEMPTED PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 06/05/2003 No Contest 
HEARING 
TAPE: FDH 034 9 COUNT: 11:42 
Defendant appears with counsel. Mr. Card addresses summary 
corrections to the Presentence Investigation Report. The State 
requests the defendant be placed with a monitor while on home 
confinement. 
The Court reserves for review, the early termination of the 
defendant, depending upon successful probation. 
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SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 
day(s) in the UTAH COUNTY JAIL. The total time suspended for this 
charge is 245 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED PURCH/POSS 
DANGEROUS WEAPON a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 3 65 day(s) in the UTAH COUNTY JAIL. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Defendant is sentenced to serve 120 day(s) of home confinement. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The Court authorizes medical release for treatment and medical 
appointments. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $1895.00 
Surcharge: $277. 97 
Due: $605.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500 . 00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $4395.00 
Total Surcharge: $277.97 
Total Principal Due: $605.00 
Plus Interest 
Fine payments are to be made to ADULT PROBATION & PA Court. 
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SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Security fee of $25.00 each count has been added to the fine. 
Complete 100 hour(s) of community service in lieu of $300.00 
Community service to be completed through ADULT PROBATION AND 
PAROLE. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE. 
Defendant to serve 12 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the UTAH COUNTY JAIL. 
Defendant is to report by October 27, 2003 by 5:00 p.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 605.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Defendant is ordered to enter into an agreement with the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department and comply strictly with the terms 
of probation. 
Defendant is ordered to make himself/herself available to the Adult 
Probation and Parole and to the Court when requested to do so. 
Defendant is ordered to advise Adult Probation and Parole and this 
Court of a current address at all times while on probation. 
Defendant is ordered to not violate the laws of the United States, 
the State of Utah, the laws of any state or any municipality. 
Defendant is ordered to serve jail in the Utah County Jail as 
ordered by the court. 
Fines and fees to be paid as directed by Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Defendant is ordered to pay a supervision fee at the discretion of 
the probation officer. 
Defendant is ordered to permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole 
to search his person, residence or his vehicle or any other 
property under his control without a warrant at any time, day or 
nght, to ensure compliance with the probation agreement. 
Defendant is ordered to remain drug and alcohol-free for the 
duration of probation and submit to tests for the presence of drugs 
or alcohol. 
Do not frequent establishments where alcohol is chief item of 
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order. 
Do not frequent places where drugs are used or sold, nor associate 
with persons known to use or sell non-prescribed controlled 
substances, and not obtain prescriptions for controlled substances 
without prior knowledge of probation officer. 
Defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the monitor^ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 031401281 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
By Hand STATE OF UTAH 
By Hand DEFENDER PUBLIC 
By Hand UTAH COUNTY JAIL 
By Hand AP&P 
Dated th i s ^ day of o c 20 d5 
£J 
Deputy Court Clerk 
?#? 
ROSS C. BLAOKHAM (#0357) 
Sanpete County Attorney 
S'-npet;^  Country Courthouse 
Manti, Utah °4642 
Telpphone: (801) 335-6^1 
State of Utah 
County of Sanpete 
(, the undersigned, County Ctert and ex-officio Cterkof th« 
Sixth Distnct Court In and for Sanpete County, State of Utah, 
hereby certify that this document is a truo, and correct copy 7 ) . j , * .,
 y j 0* the original on file m my office. l^uto-Misw n vrUf^//4£s au& 
WITNESS my hand and seal of my office at Manii, Sanpeta SIXTH JOWCIAL DISTRICT COUtf 
County, Utah to / 4 davof M W ^(fys SAWPETE COUNTY, UTAH 
Sandy Neiil, County Clerk n jL^Ux^^mm 
IN THF SIXTH .TlWntL^fi^^ m n M T V ^ "/V ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
;TE COUNTY 
THF STATF OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plamtit't", 
LEONARD P. STEWART, 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
COMMITMENT ORDER 
Criminal No* 1494 
Defendant 
On the r)th day of January, 1988, before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
aooeared Ross C. Blackham, Sanpetp County Attorney for the State of Utah, and 
the Defendant was personally present and v/as represented by his attorney Paul 
R. Frischknecht, 
The Court having asked if the Defendant has anything to say why 
judgment should not be pronounced and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
shown or appearing to the Court. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that Defendant is guilty of aggravated robbery, a First 
Degree Felony but pursuant to U.C.A. 76-3-402 the judment conviction is ordered 
entered for the next lowest category of offense, a Second Degree Felony. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that Defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah 
State Prison for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years and is 
fined the sum of $2,000.00. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Sheriff of Sanpete County take the said 
Defendant, Leonard B. Stewart and delier him to the Utah State Prison where 
said j ^ S ^ a n t shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in accordance 
Judgment and Commitment. 
jfy / ] day of January, 1988 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ORDER 
State vs. Leonard B. Stewart 
Criminal No. 1494 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Order to the Defendant's Attorney, Paul R. Frischknecht, at 
50 North Main, Manti, Utah 84642, postage prepaid this c^D day of January, 
1988. 
A6w^~- \J\frLjfxJ\0V 
Diane Crowther 
